Syria Part 2

The "weakened West"? I think not

The American Response: When Barack Obama declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian armed forces was a "red line" that would force the US to intervene, and then proceeded not to intervene when said weapons were used, many were quick to seize on his indecision as an example of a now impotent America. They claimed this former big stick wielding giant could no longer influence the world the way it has in the past. Unsurprisingly, many of these critics were woefully under-informed, or outright misinformed or ignorant, regarding the Syrian conflict in the first place. If protecting the Syrian people was such a big issue for these people, then why weren't they decrying supposed US cowardice from the start of this war, where conventional weapons had already killed thousands of civilians far prior to the use of chemical arms? Part of it was just cynical political posturing by people already opposed to Obama for a variety of other reasons, but there is a dangerous undercurrent of amnesia and outright ignorance regarding recent US military forays into the Middle East that certainly seems to affect some of these critics. All Western airstrikes in Libya succeeded in doing was speeding up the exit of a despot already on his last legs so the country could be left a patchwork of militia fiefdoms and lawlessness. In Iraq, where not even hundreds of thousands of Western troops and trillions of Western dollars could succeed in building something resembling Republican democracy or fostering real stability, we've already seen more deaths from suicide bombings and sectarian violence this year than in any year since 2008. The country's Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi fled the country last year and has yet to return following being hit with a death sentence for allegedly organizing and funding "death squads" made up of militant Sunni partisans and targeting prominent Shi'ites in the government for assassination. Depending on who you believe, the charges against him may be baseless and simply part of an effort by Iraq's Shi'ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to get rid of Hashemi, but either way it doesn't reflect well at all on the country's leaders. If it weren't for the absolute mess in Syria, the virtual collapse of the Iraqi state would be a much bigger story right now.

Taking this all into account, I think it's hard to argue that forgoing direct intervention in Syria at this point wasn't the right decision. Many disagree with this assertion, and it's not that I don't think their concerns are valid. In an editorial piece in the September 21st issue of The Economist, I think this opposing view was summed up pretty well in this paragraph: "Now every tyrant knows that a red line set by the leader of the Free World is really just a threat to ask legislators how they feel about enforcing it. Dictators will be freer to maim and murder their own people, proliferators like North Korea less scared to proceed with spreading WMD, China and Russia ever more content to test their muscles in the vacuum left by the West." While this is a more articulate description of the concerns of Syrian interventionists than what was said by some of our elected officials, I think it suffers from some of the same amnesia that less articulate arguments have been rife with. Rogue regimes, especially North Korea, have proven time and again that they aren't intimidated by military force, especially when it doesn't come close to affecting them directly. Western armies have been mucking around in the Middle East on a near non-stop basis since Desert Storm. It hasn't stopped President Assad from aping the brutal tactics of his Father, it hasn't stopped Hezbollah from backing him up and continuing to antagonize Israel, and it sure as hell hasn't had an effect on a North Korean regime which gains a good portion of its country's GDP trafficking arms, counterfeiting Dollars and Euros, and producing and trafficking methamphetamine on an industrial scale. I think the true power of the West, particularly America, to influence the Middle East was outlined quite succintly by Michael Wahid Hanna, a senior fellow at The Century Institute, in a recent interview with Vice News focusing on the current troubles in Egypt. "The United States can't dictate political outcomes in the Middle East...however they still play a central role that nobody else can fill." When the Balkans were torn apart by civil war in the '90s, it wasn't Russia or China who facilitated talks between warring factions (in Dayton, Ohio of all places) and helped put an end to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In the '70s, '80s and '90s it wasn't Russia or China who got Israel and a litany of countries, which spent the better part of the Cold War trying to wipe them off the map, communicating, trading, and even in some cases cooperating with one another. None of the countries in the Middle East currently getting billions from Russia and/or China are led by people naive or crazy enough to look at their relationship as anything more than a marriage of convenience, and though Russia has stepped in to help secure the Assad regime's chemical weaponry, no one is looking to their leaders to provide a cogent, realistic solution that will stop the fighting. It's not their M.O., and it never has been. The US, on the other hand, was working to help end conflicts like the Russo-Japanese war long before the post-World War Two era when we ascended to "hyperpower" status and such tasks were more or less forced on our government by default. The West is not weak, it's simply somewhat preoccupied as of late due to economic crises in Europe and political infighting and douchebaggery in America. It should be a priority for both major American political parties and the leaders of nations like Germany and the UK to work to promote negotiations between not only the warring factions in Syria, but the outside regimes mentioned in the last post fueling the broader Sunni/Shia conflict in so many areas. It would surely be an arduous process, but if they still don't realize it after the last decade any President of the United States should have this tattooed on their forehead: The United States can't dictate political outcomes in the Middle East. Or anywhere else in the world, really, except maybe Albania which regularly petitions us to become a State. Anyway, from an objective standpoint, which failure would be more of a headache to deal with: "We tried long and hard to get these people to talk to each other they didn't want to...it sucks, gas prices are probably going to go up, sorry", or having to explain to Americans that for some reason we failed yet again to bring freedom and democracy to a country with guns and bombs, the economy is further fucked because of it, oh and gas prices are gonna go up too...

A big old graph is always useful when you're engaging in calculated fearmongering.

Israel has been largely unaffected by the war in Syria, and their concerns, while valid, should have little impact on the West's response: Ah, Benjamin Netanyahu. I always found it funny that even though Netanyahu and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad played the role of each other's prime nemesis, they both rose to power thanks to support from the most bellicose, reactionary and frightened segments of their respective electorates. Both are former military men who not only made it clear they'd never really returned to a civilian mindset, they had no intention of trying. The narrative of a State of Israel constantly under siege is and has been very beneficial to Netanyahu's political career, just as the notion that a strong Iranian state was the one thing keeping Sunni terrorists and American soldiers from overrunning the Middle East was a boon for Ahmadinejad and his political allies. Much of Israel's current Syria policy is based on the close relationship Assad's government has with Iran's leaders. In a recent interview with the Jerusalem Post, outgoing Israeli Ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, made it clear that Israel's number one goal regarding Syria is to get President Assad out of power, even if it empowers groups linked to Al-Qaeda in the country. "The initial message about the Syrian issue was that we always wanted [Syrian President] Bashar Assad to go, we always preferred the bad guys who weren’t backed by Iran to the bad guys who were backed by Iran...
We understand that they are pretty bad guys. Not everyone in the opposition is a bad guy. Still, the greatest danger to Israel was by the strategic arc that extends from Tehran to Damascus, to Beirut.
And we saw the Assad regime as the keystone in that arc. That is a position we had well before the outbreak of hostilities in Syria.
With the outbreak of hostilities we continued to want Assad to go." To me, this sounds disturbingly similar to the short-sighted Syria policy currently being enacted by Saudi Arabia. They see the current Iran-Hezbollah-Assad axis as the paramount threat in the region while refusing to acknowledge that Syria could easily remain just as much of a problem, if not more of one, under the rule of groups like ISIS. Oren himself points out in the same interview that fairly sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry found its way into the hands of multiple enemies of the Israeli state following the Libyan civil war, and while Syria is hardly a military juggernaut they possess even larger arms caches and newer, better maintained weaponry than Col. Gaddafi's forces did. It would be foolhardy not to expect the same sort of thing to happen, right across their border this time, if Assad is removed in a manner that leaves a power vacuum in Syria. There are those in the Israeli government and military that currently like to promote the idea that the clash between Assad's forces and rebels with ranks largely made up of Islamists who don't think Israel should even exist is doing the job of weakening two of their enemies at the same time, though to his credit Oren doesn't seem to be one of them. He doesn't explicitly go against the Netanyahu administration's policy in the in the interview, but he does elude to the fact that Israel underestimated just how chaotic the war in Syria would become. Israel's leaders would do well to look at other nations bordering Syria like Turkey and Jordan that have been flooded with refugees and had stray artillery shells fired from Syria land on their citizens homes. Having a failed state right next door is never helpful, regardless of how awful its current ruler may be.

The notion that the Assad regime may try to galvanize support from other Muslims, or simply sow more chaos in the region, by openly attacking Israel has been floated by some. Conveniently, those promoting this view rarely bring up the fact that Israel has been able to attack Syria with impunity multiple times during the civil war, and has yet to face any serious blowback for their actions. These strikes have all occurred when the Israeli military believed Assad's forces were getting ready to move weapons to Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon, and were by all accounts successful in their objectives. If the Assad regime was actually set on, or capable of a significant attack on Israeli soil, wouldn't they have already engaged in some sort of direct retaliation following one of these strikes? It seems clear that this notion is just another example of the typical fearmongering engaged in by Netanyahu and his cabinet. As evidenced by the words of Mr. Oren and others, the Israeli government now seeks to lump Assad and Hezbollah in with Iran as "existential threats", the sort of threats that they'll need backing from their American ally to take on. Not only is it in no way fair for the Israelis to insist that no one in the Mideast they have disagreements with should be allowed to have nuclear power, it's also unrealistic and impossible for Israel to maintain its status as the region's only nuclear-armed power indefinitely. Netanyahu needs to stop relying on US pressure to accomplish Israeli policy goals they themselves are incapable of advancing. Outside powers aren't going to be anymore successful in preventing the spread of nuclear arms to Iran and other Middle Eastern states than they were in preventing India, Pakistan and North Korea from going nuclear. This technology has existed since 1945, and it's just as foolish to think we can keep it from spreading as it is to think we could place a moratorium on smartphones or the internet in some part of the world. The Israelis need to face up to the fact that they'll likely have more than one nuclear-armed neighbor within the next few decades, and adjust their policies accordingly. Regardless of whether the next administration in the White House is Republican or Democrat, it's likely that the US will continue to relax its policy of exceptionalism toward Israel because it's simply not realistic anymore no matter what political perspective you're coming from. A nation that accounts for a fraction of the people and land area in the Middle East cannot and should not be responsible for dictating what is and what is not allowed in a region of such importance to the world at large.

The majority of Kurdish rebel groups include female fighters.

The continuing plight of the Kurds: Just as in neighboring Iraq, chaos in Syria has seemingly afforded the nation's Kurdish population a chance to assert their autonomy following years of repression. Many cite an uprising in 2004 in the Kurdish-dominated city of Qamishlo as the genesis of the current Kurdish rebel movement in Syria, but it wasn't until the government was forced to pull troops out of Kurdish areas in Northern Syria in 2011 to deal with strife in other areas that Kurdish militias became the de facto power in parts of of the North. Unlike their Iraqi brethren though, Syria's Kurds aren't sitting on billions of dollars in oil and natural gas. Syria is one of the most resource devoid countries in the Middle East, and its Northern areas are no exception. They also lack the isolation from chaos that is present in Iraqi Kurdistan. Since the US invasion in 2003, northern Iraq has almost operated as an independent nation. Their leaders are able to sign off on oil exploration deals with foreign companies independent of central government supervision, and while Syria's Kurds are protected by one of the country's largest militias, they aren't near as well-armed, well-fed and well-trained as the famed Peshmerga in Iraq. All of this would lead one to believe that the current autonomy enjoyed by Syria's Kurdish-majority areas is fleeting, and it seems the Assad regime is well aware of this. This hasn't stopped the YPG, Syria's largest Kurdish militia, from clashing with regime forces, but they certainly aren't allied with any major rebel faction. The YPG has also clashed with rebel groups in the northern towns of Ras al-Ain and Azaz, along with Kurdish areas of Aleppo. Lines of communication between the regime and the YPG remain open, Syria's Alawite leadership has always been adept at cultivating support from the Kurds and the Assyrian Christians, or Syriacs, the country's other main minority groups. The message the Assad regime is selling them is that even though years of repression under the President and his father weren't great, life under a hardline Islamist regime would be downright unbearable. This has led to allegations by some rebel groups that the Kurds are openly in league with Assad, beginning a cycle of tit-for-tat beheadings and other such atrocities involving the YPG and rebel factions such as ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. Just like the main conflict between the regime and the rebels, the current Kurdish situation in Syria is beyond complicated. For a time, it did look as if the Kurds and Syriacs may enjoy more a stake in a new Syria, but as the conflict drags on that looks less likely every day. Syrian and Iraqi Christians have been fleeing their native land for decades, and have long-established immigrant communities in places like Australia and Canada. The process has sped up even more in the past ten years or so before growing to a full-on diaspora where Syria is concerned, and both of the most recent Popes made a number of public pleas for help on behalf of the Arab Christian population. It doesn't appear as if the leadership of most Middle Eastern nations gave a damn. Thousands of Kurdish refugees have already joined their more prosperous kin in Iraq, and thousands more have streamed across the border into Turkey, a country whose historical record when it comes to repressing the Kurds is probably even worse than Syria's. Turkey is far more stable and economically well-off than Syria however, and it appears many Kurds will put aside a historical enmity simply to raise their kids in an environment where they don't have to worry about suicide bombers and stray mortars. I do think that the Kurds will remain somewhat of a force in Syria, but any notion of gaining the same sort of power they enjoy in Iraq is a pipe dream. The YPG and its allies are going to be forced to go all in with either the regime or the rebels at some point, and will likely still be economically and politically marginalized in Syria following the end of the war. Such is life for the Kurds. Same as it ever was...
Sources:

Vice article on the YPG: http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/meet-the-ypg 
Article on August 19th clashes between the YPG and Islamist rebels: http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/world/la-fg-wn-syrian-refugees-kurds-20130819 
Interview with Ambassador Michael Oren: http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/Diplomacy-Obama-passes-the-kishka-test-326570 
In-depth piece on Israel's January 30th strike on Syria:   http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/east-side-story/why-did-israel-attack-syria-now-and-why-did-the-syrians-admit-it.premium-1.500708
Article on the current situation at the Israeli-Syrian border: http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-israel-syria-20131011,0,4126292.story#axzz2ilfeZypy
Opinion piece-"Obama's Syria war is really about Iran and Israel": http://www.thenation.com/blog/176040/obamas-syria-war-really-about-iran-and-israel#
Article on the charges levied against Iraq's Vice President: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-iraq-hashemi-idUSBRE8A00TJ20121101
"Syriac Christians, Kurds boost cooperation in Syria": http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/syria-syriacs-assyrians-kurds-pyd.html
Wikipedia overview of Kurdish rebels across the Middle East: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga
Opinion piece- "Netanyahu's lost battles against the West on nuclear Iran":  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/opinion/2013/10/netanyahu-yaalon-israel-iaf-iran-nuclear-uranium-bomb.html


     
      

Syria part 1

                                                                            
The brothers pictured above were born and bred in France. By the admission of their own father, they were raised on "Nintendo and Cocoa Puffs", not radical Islam. They are a symbol of how far beyond the realm of ridiculousness and dumbassery most wars are waged in that the current war in Syria has traveled. It's reminiscent of a quote from the recent movie Dredd about the teeming morass of Megacity One: "It's a meatgrinder. People go in, meat comes out." It's a futile stalemate in which neither side is accomplishing anything of substance, and to make matters worse the outside parties tasked with ending the bloodshed are going about it in completely the wrong manner. Until they wake up and use basic logic as a weapon against the rampant idiocy currently plaguing the political process in the Mideast, the women and children of Syria will continue to suffer and young men, maybe even pale faced simpletons from abroad completely detached from reality like those above, will continue to feed the meatgrinder.

The Syrian civil war is not, in my opinion, a part of the oft referred to "Clash of Civilizations" between the West and the Middle East. It's an old fashioned proxy war, of the same type we saw spring up almost daily in the 20th century, only the main players pulling the strings (Saudi Arabia and Iran) were formerly in the position of the manipulated, not the manipulators. Just as they've been doing in Iraq and Lebanon, the two countries support rival armed factions they believe will help further their political aims in the region, usually at the expense of acting governments and the will of many people actually living in said war zones. Western governments and intelligence agencies have known this is what they're dealing with in the Middle East for years now. Even before diplomatic cables were leaked during the Wikileaks scandal alleging that Iran's Revolutionary Guard was training, arming and funding Shia militia groups in Iraq while the Saudi regime was doing the same for Sunni groups, US military and political leaders had openly said as much in many an interview. Why then are so many politicians and pundits forgetting the lessons of our multiple forays into Iraq and acting like a single military strike will help end a war that is being fueled by factors we can't hope to control, or in an even more sensational supposition, framing this as a United States vs Russia conflict at its heart?

A map showing where various Syrian rebel groups operate, courtesy of Turkey's Hurriyet Daily News

The Russian Conundrum:
In the US at least, I think much of our skewed perspective regarding the war has to do with the way the media is covering it over here. Every report on the war seems to focus on whether or not Israel will be affected by the violence, or how it's impacting US/Russian relations. While our intelligence agencies, reporters working in the region, and analysts who spend all day monitoring the region seem to be keenly aware that Iran, Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser extent) Qatar plus the smaller Gulf states are much more active in the conflict than any other outside power, many of our elected officials and the big three cable news networks seem to be either ignorant of, or deliberately ignoring this reality. I'm not sure if this is because they think most Americans are too stupid to grasp the complicated realities of the situation, or they just think lying about an impending US vs Russia battle royale will make for good ratings. I'm not saying that Russia isn't a major force helping to keep the Assad regime in power because they are, but I think their relationship with Syria has much in common with the relationship North Korea and China have. As in, they're willing to take their money for a variety of weapons and technical equipment but they're also tired of dealing with an international pariah who's constantly complicating matters and simply doesn't have their shit together. China has recently slowed its military exports to North Korea to a trickle, and I think it's possible Russia could eventually be persuaded to do the same with Syria. However, as long as the anti-Assad resistance is dominated by Sunni fundamentalists, which is something even ardent crusaders for US intervention like Senator John McCain will now admit, the West has to acknowledge that many of the concerns which are fueling Russian support of Assad are legitimate. Many outside Russia like to forget that they've been fighting Islamic militants in their Caucasian provinces since the mid-'90s. Like the Assad regime, they've had to deal with foreigners, including Saudi princes, funding terrorist groups who kill civilians within their borders. In fact, a recently leaked document published in the UK newspaper The Daily Telegraph contained this little nugget:

[Saudi intel chief] Prince Bandar [bin Sultan] pledged to safeguard Russia’s naval base in Syria if the Assad regime is toppled, but he also hinted at Chechen terrorist attacks on Russia’s Winter Olympics in Sochi if there is no accord. “I can give you a guarantee to protect the Winter Olympics next year. The Chechen groups that threaten the security of the games are controlled by us,” he allegedly said.

                                                                     

Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US and current head of their Intelligence apparatus (on the right) . Proud supporter and facilitator of arms sales to Iran in the '80s, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and pretty much every recent US policy decision regarding the Mideast that's come back to bite us in the ass. He also used to have a summer home on property adjacent to Hunter S. Thompson's home in Aspen.

I can't imagine the US being as supportive of Saudi aims in Syria if we'd received the same type of thinly-veiled threats from one of their highest ranking government officials. As mentioned in the blurb above, the Russian naval base in Tartus is central to their Syria policy. Not only is it integral to propping up waning Russian influence in the Mideast, it allows them to deploy their Navy to protect Russian shipping in the area around the volatile Horn of Africa where piracy is commonplace. The Syrians living in and around Tartus are also supportive of Russia's endeavors there. The area is populated by a majority of Alawites and Christians who are sympathetic to President Assad, and they appreciate the economic opportunities and general stability the Russian presence contributes to. 

Taking this into consideration, I think it would only help the US and its Western European allies to concede at least for now to continued Russian influence in Syria, while at the same time working to get them to realize that they picked the wrong horse in this race. Convincing the Russians that their support of Syria could easily have the same devastating effect on their relationship with the Muslim world that their invasion of Afghanistan did should be a priority for Western diplomats. The point that they have so much more to lose by siding with Assad and working against the West needs to be driven home until Putin and his foreign minister Sergei Lavrov accept this reality. What that would likely require is the concession of a divided Syria, both on Russia's part and by those supporting the anti-Assad rebellion in Syria. It's not a secret that the rebellion enjoys it's strongest support away from the Syrian coast in its rural countryside, Eastern and Northern border areas and certain major cities further from the coast like Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor. If the Russians, along with a few prominent figures in the military or civil society currently aiding President Assad, could be convinced that removing him from the equation and negotiating with the Free Syrian Army and other groups to retain a non-rebel controlled rump state along the Mediterranean Coast is a preferable option to civil war it could benefit everyone involved in this battle of attrition. Admittedly, that's a huge if, but the FSA has to realize by now that they've failed miserably in trying to depose Assad through purely military means. A good portion of those who are still behind the regime aren't fervent supporters of Assad, they're just frightened at the prospect of a Taliban-like hardline Islamist regime coming to power if he's forced out. Many in favor of Western intervention in Syria like to gloss over the fact that the Free Syrian Army is just one of many factions fighting against Assad, and conflict between rebel factions is common. Even when Assad is inevitably killed, or possibly flees the country like the Shah of Iran did, it's likely that Syria will remain a divided country. The way I see it, the Western powers should accept this as an imminent probability, and work toward the most non-violent future possible for these two Syrias. Unfortunately, that task will require reigning in enemies, and even erstwhile allies, far more volatile than the Russians.

Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon cheering on Syrian President Bashar Assad and Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, their fearless leader.

Iran and Saudi Arabia's "Great Game":

The "Great Game", that oft romanticized battle between Britain and Czarist Russia for colonial domination of Central Asia may have taken place on a much larger scale than the Syrian civil war, but I think it's analogous to the situation there. The agendas being pursued by the Saudi and Iranian governments in Syria represent a dangerous and, in my opinion, naive view of the war. Like the Great Game, it's a rivalry based on suspicion, fear and long-held ethnic and religious stereotypes. To the British, the Russians of the late 1800s were a bunch of boorish, backward and drunken Eastern Orthodox Slavs who already had too much territory for their own good. To the Russians, the British were a snooty nation of effete intellectuals with a superiority complex interfering in an area thousands of miles outside their borders simply because they could. The Saudi leadership, members of a hardline Sunni Muslim sect known as the Wahhabis, view Shi'ite (or Shia) Muslims, who make up the vast majority of Iran's population, as heathen infidels. The Ayatollahs who control Iran's policy making view the Saudis and their Gulf state allies as the spearhead of an American effort to dominate the region. For a brief period in the '80s and '90s, Saddam Hussein provided the two countries with a common enemy, as his blend of secular Arab nationalism and Stalinesque thuggery was equally offensive and frightening to both nations.

Their relationship for the bulk of the past two decades or so has involved a bloody chess game with each nation trying to cement itself as the dominant non-Israeli military and political power in the region. When the Taliban first came to power in Afghanistan, their fellow Sunni hardliners in charge of Saudi Arabia initially saw them as a like-minded ally, and even offered Afghanistan support in 1998 when it appeared they were on the verge of war with Iran after nine Iranian diplomats in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif were killed by Taliban soldiers. As Hezbollah, founded with Iranian money and direction during the height of the Lebanese civil war in the '80s, continued to grow in power and influence in Lebanon in the early years of the 21st century, the Saudis took it upon themselves to fund and arm Sunni militia groups and parties opposed to Hezbollah's agenda. This has gone on to effect the war in Syria, as Hezbollah has sent fighters to bolster President Assad's forces while thousands of Lebanese Sunnis have volunteered to fight with the rebels and more are crossing the border into Syria every day. In Yemen, Iran helps fund and arm a group of rebel Shi'ite tribesmen in the north of the country known as the Houthis, while the Saudis offer support, including occasional direct military involvement of their own, to a coalition of Sunni tribesmen that has taken up the fight against the Houthis following the virtual abandonment of the area by Yemen's central government and army. In Bahrain, a country whose population is estimated to be 80-90% Shi'ite, Saudi Arabia has sent soldiers in to prop up an autocracy led by minority Sunnis, while Iran has helped stir up political agitation against the regime that exploded into rioting in 2011 followed by a prolonged state of emergency and thousands of arrests, many without legitimate charges, of Bahrainis accused of anti-regime activities.

The areas highlighted in brown are the most affected by the current Houthi insurrection in the desert region along the Saudi-Yemeni border. Just another theater of pain currently at the mercy of Iranian and Saudi directors.

 Which brings us to Syria. The only nominally independent force not saturated with hardliners and foreign Jihadists among the Syrian rebels (aside from separatist Kurds with little interest in any new Syrian government), the previously mentioned FSA, has been steadily waning in influence over the course of this year. Much of that has to do with former FSA soldiers of a more extremist bent defecting to groups like the ever more prominent ISIS, or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, whose leadership contains many people currently or formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group is engaged in terrorist activities in Iraq along with their campaign in Syria. Not only is ISIS aided by links to plenty of terrorist groups all over the region, many of the same tribes who dominate Western Iraq have fellow tribesmen across the porous border with Syria that they're only too happy to hook up with weapons and warm bodies for the fight. The Saudis have also been a factor in the decline of FSA influence, as it's become abundantly clear they'd rather channel their aid to groups like ISIS. While other supporters of the rebellion like Qatar and Turkey have been more discerning with who they send money and weapons to, Saudi Intelligence has shown they'll give arms to anyone so long as they're used against Assad. Another group called Ahrar al-Sham, a union of Sunni Islamist militias who subscribe to Salafism, (a belief system only slightly more moderate than the Wahhabism espoused by the House of Sa'ud) has also usurped territory, fighters and prestige from the FSA since they spearheaded the formation of a national Salafist alliance called the Syrian Islamic Front in December of 2012. One of their main sources of income is funds solicited by prominent Salafist preachers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait who are fervently anti-Western, and anti-Iran. Of further importance, unlike the FSA both of these groups are vehemently against any Western military intervention.

On the Iranian end, interference in Syria's affairs has been even more direct. On top of pulling Hezbollah's strings as previously mentioned, soldiers from their "elite" Revolutionary Guard have been on the ground in Syria since the early days of the rebellion. Certain commentators have even referred to the war as "Iran's Vietnam" since they're currently spending about 1 billion USD a month to prop up the Assad regime. Despite the current state of things between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the recent election in Iran may offer a glimmer of hope. New Iranian President Hassan Rohani has already shown himself to be much more pragmatic and willing to engage with the West than his infamous predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's assertion that he's a "wolf in sheep's clothing", longtime enemies have already been willing to talk to Rohani. There was his much talked about phone conversation with President Obama last week, and Saudi King Abdullah was among the first leaders to call and congratulate Rohani after his election. I think this reflects a realization by the political leadership of both countries that their rivalry is costing them more than it's gaining them, and it may offer an opening for an outside power like the US to encourage and facilitate direct negotiations between their leaders aimed to end their "Great Game". Unfortunately it will take much more than just the political leaders of both nations coming to that conclusion, as both have large, semi-independent intelligence apparatuses that need to be reined in. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard has access to billions of dollars that are completely unregulated by the Iranian government proper, and their foreign endeavors in theaters like Syria frequently operate as independent enterprises. Saudi Intelligence hasn't quite gone "off the reservation" in the same manner, but much of their activities in places like Yemen and Syria involve middlemen and even active combatants involved with groups no more moderate than the Taliban. Prince Bandar and some of his more hawkish allies in the Saudi government have been successful in steering the country's foreign policy toward confrontation with Iran largely due to the words of Ahmadinejad and the actions of the Revolutionary Guard. Those actions also led to very public disputes between Iran's unelected Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, and an effort by Khamenei to begin to restrict the power of the Guard toward the end of Ahmadinejad's second term. Iran shares a border with Pakistan, and Khamenei and the other Ayatollahs are very aware of the damage caused in that country by a bloated and corrupt intelligence apparatus operating as a state within a state. The time is ripe to get both nations at the negotiating table, but I think Iran will have to make the first move by backing away from Assad and telling Hezbollah to get out of Syria. Even with Ahmadinejad gone that's a lot to hope for.

In Part 2 I'll focus on how I think the US should try to impact the war, why alarmism in the US and Israel about the war somehow spilling into Israeli territory is unsubstantiated and ridiculous, and the ongoing issue of Kurdish fighters who support neither the government or the aims of the rebels in Syria. Also probably whatever new horrible things have happened in Syria since I posted this.

Sources:
Articles on Europeans joining the fight in Syria: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/11/seduced-by-war-europeans-join-the-fight-in-syria.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23766892 
Nice interactive map of who currently controls what territory in Syria: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/07/20137188552345899.html
Article on Saudi/Russian "secret" discussions on Syria: http://www.businessinsider.com/saudis-russia-sochi-olympics-terrorism-syria-2013-8
Brown Moses Blog, an excellent source for info on Syria with many pictures taken by Syrian journalists and testimony from those living through the war: http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/
 A piece on the city of Tartus, where Russia's Naval base is located: http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/06/02/187973123/tartous-a-rare-quiet-city-in-war-ravaged-syria
Reuters piece on Hezbollah intervention in Syria: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/26/us-syria-hezbollah-special-report-idUSBRE98P0AI20130926
Very informative piece on how weapons from the Saudis and Qatar get into Syria, and who they go to: http://world.time.com/2012/09/18/syrias-secular-and-islamist-rebels-who-are-the-saudis-and-the-qataris-arming/
A Council on Foreign Relations overview of Iran's Revolutionary Guard: http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324
Two links focusing on Saudi and Iranian intervention in Lebanon and Yemen: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/opinion/2013/08/lebanon-center-iran-saudi-cold-war-levant.html

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/security/01/06/war-between-the-houthis-and-sala.html
And lastly two articles on the increasing clout of Islamist rebel groups in Syria:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/10/syria-opposition-isis-border-emirate.html
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/weekinreview-1062013.html

Update-Probably the best summation of who Syria's various rebel groups are I've seen yet from a Western source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24403003   

Another update, more Sunni vs Shia violence spreading into Lebanon-11/19: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/19/us-lebanon-blast-idUSBRE9AI08G20131119
   
Reuters) - Two suicide bombings rocked Iran's embassy compound in Lebanon on Tuesday, killing at least 23 people including an Iranian cultural attaché and hurling bodies and burning wreckage across a debris-strewn street.
A Lebanon-based al Qaeda-linked group, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, claimed responsibility and threatened further attacks unless Iran withdraw forces from Syria, where they have backed President Bashar al-Assad's 2-1/2-year-old war against rebels.